Networking

Preview — pending review

This reference is generated from the platform API contract and is still under review. Operations, fields, and descriptions can change before publication.

Delete a security rule from a group

DELETE
/scopes/{scopeId}/network/security-groups/{securityGroupId}/security-rules/{securityRuleId}

Removes a single rule from a security group, triggered by the per-row "Delete rule" action in the detail view's inbound/outbound rule tables. The rule stops being enforced on all attached ports once removal has propagated; the parent group itself is untouched. Failure leaves the rule in place in a recoverable, queryable state. Validation: the parent security group must exist in the scope and be visible to the caller → 404 NOT_FOUND; securityRuleId must reference a rule of that group → 404 NOT_FOUND; destructive-action permission (contributor or higher) is enforced → 403; a management lock on the group blocks removal → 409 LOCKED; the parent group must not be mid-deletion → 409. Async & state: Asynchronous — returns 202 with an Operation handle; the rule is removed from the group's rule set and de-programmed from attached ports in the background. resource.updated SSE frames are emitted for the parent security-group resource with a rules-array patch (rule removed) plus operation.updated frames until the terminal removed state. Errors: 401 unauthenticated; 403 caller lacks destructive-action rights; 404 unknown group or rule; 409 LOCKED when the group is lock-protected or mid-deletion; 412 when If-Match is supplied and stale; 500 on propagation workflow errors. Idempotency/Concurrency: Idempotency-Key recommended; replaying returns the original 202 Operation. If-Match with the parent group's ETag guards against removing a rule from a group that changed since it was read.

Authorization

bearerToken
headerAuthorizationBearer <token>

An API token (pc_live_…) or a service-account key (sak_live_…), created in Identity & Access Management and sent as Authorization: Bearer <token>. Requests are rate limited per credential and per tenant: every response carries X-RateLimit-Limit, X-RateLimit-Remaining and X-RateLimit-Reset, and a refused request gets 429 RATE_LIMITED with Retry-After.

Path Parameters

scopeId*string

Opaque ownership+authorization scope resolving to tenant + subscription + project.

securityGroupId*string

Identifier of the parent security group.

securityRuleId*string

Identifier of the rule to remove (e.g. r-w1).

Header Parameters

Idempotency-Key?string

Optional; recommended for safe retries. When sent, the same key+body within 24h replays the original result and the same key with a different body is 409 CONFLICT; keys are unique per tenant. When an API token or service-account (bearer) caller omits it, the request is applied once with no replay protection (a retry may apply it again). A console session gets one from the edge.

Formatuuid
If-Match?string

ETag for optimistic concurrency on mutations/deletes; mismatch results in 412.

Response Body

Rule removal accepted; it is being de-programmed from all attached ports. Track via the returned operation.

application/json
  1. response

A long-running operation record. GET /operations/{operationId} returns its current state.

id*string

Operation identifier, unique platform-wide.

action*string

Canonical action id that started this operation, e.g. compute.instance.create.

state*OperationState

State machine for long-running operations. PENDING and RUNNING are transitional; the rest are terminal.

Value in"PENDING""RUNNING""SUCCEEDED""FAILED""CANCELLED"
resourceKind?|

Kind of the target resource (matches RealtimeEvent.kind), null for resource-less actions.

resourceId?|

Identifier of the target resource; null until the resource is allocated.

resourceName?|

Human-readable name of the target resource captured when the operation was opened; null when unknown or the resource has been deleted (clients fall back to resourceId).

principalId?|

Subject id (user id/email or service-account id) of the actor that initiated this operation, captured at the create chokepoint; null on internal/worker paths with no request-scoped principal or for historical rows. This is the real actor the Activity feed renders.

sourceIp?|

Source IP address of the request that initiated this operation; null when unavailable (internal/worker paths, historical rows).

progressPercent?|

Best-effort progress; null when the action does not report progress.

Range0 <= value <= 100
error?|null

Populated only when state is FAILED (or CANCELLED with partial rollback notes).

warning?|null

Non-fatal degradation recorded on an operation that still SUCCEEDED - the primary action completed but something explicitly requested could not be delivered (e.g. publicIp was requested at instance create but no floating IP could be assigned). On a CANCELLED create it reports that the provider resource had already been created and was kept (live and billed until deleted; details.disposition = left_in_place). Same code+message shape as error so clients render both uniformly; null when the operation ran without degradation.

startedAt?|

When the worker began executing; null while PENDING.

finishedAt?|

When a terminal state was reached; null while transitional.

createdAt*string
updatedAt*string
curl -X DELETE "https://example.com/scopes/string/network/security-groups/string/security-rules/string"
{  "id": "string",  "action": "string",  "state": "PENDING",  "resourceKind": "string",  "resourceId": "string",  "resourceName": "string",  "principalId": "string",  "sourceIp": "string",  "progressPercent": 0,  "error": {    "code": "string",    "message": "string",    "field": "string",    "details": {},    "retryable": false  },  "warning": {    "code": "string",    "message": "string",    "field": "string",    "details": {},    "retryable": false  },  "startedAt": "string",  "finishedAt": "string",  "createdAt": "string",  "updatedAt": "string"}